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Shooting Down Drug Traffickers 
Phillip A. Johnson 
T HIS IS THE STORY of how a United States statute, enacted to combat sabotage of commercial airliners by terrorists, produced the completely 
unintended result of shutting down a major element of coalition counterdrug 
operations in South America for seven months. It is also the story of how the 
United States Government solved that problem, but left unresolved significant 
international law issues concerning the use of force against civil aircraft 
suspected of drug trafficking. 
Coalition Counterdrug Operations 
There is no doubt that international drug trafficking causes significant harm 
to the United States. Illicit drug use by more than a million U.S. citizens creates 
crime and other serious social and public health problems, and the huge illegal 
profits generated by illicit drug trafficking present a threat to the integrity of 
financial institutions and public officials. As bad as the drug problem may be for 
the U.S., it is infinitely worse for the nations where illicit drugs are produced, 
processed, and transported. The wealth and extreme violence of drug gangs' 
have corrupted and intimidated public officials, distorted national economies, 
denied the governments of these nations effective control over their borders 
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and large areas of their territory, and in some cases provided direct support for 
armed rebellions. 
A number of nations in the Caribbean and in Central and South America, 
which together supply much of the illicit drugs entering the US., have agreed 
to cooperate with the United States in coalition counterdrug operations. With 
U.S. support, they have carried out some very significant drug suppression 
operations, including crop eradication, destruction of processing facilities, 
interference with the supply of precursor chemicals, interruption of 
transportation networks, seizure of drugs, confiscation of funds, and arrest, 
prosecution, and punishment of offenders. The United States has provided 
funds, equipment, training, technical advice, transportation, and intelligence 
to the effort. Host nations rely on such support to carry out operations 
involving direct confrontation with suspected traffickers, such as arrest, 
search, and seizure. Our personnel are limited to a support role out of respect, 
in part, for host nation sovereignty, which traditionally carries with it a 
monopoly on the exercise of police and military power within its borders. The 
restrictions are also a product of a broader policy against involving U.S. military 
units in arrests and seizures, whether in foreign nations, on the high seas, or 
within US. territory.1 
For example, in a number of nations, US. military forces have provided and 
operated ground,based and aerial radar and communications interception 
facilities, the information from which has been supplied to the host nations. 
This information has been used to spot suspected drug trafficking flights and 
determine their routes and schedules, locate airfields, identify aircraft 
(sometimes leading to identification of their crew members and owners), force 
aircraft to land or to leave the nation's airspace, or execute an "end,game" in 
which host nation police or military forces have carried out raids on airfields 
and other facilities. In a statement to Congress on 10 March 1994, the 
Department of Defense "drug czar" said that a shift in counterdrug policy 
toward operations in the "source nations" would result in increasing this type of 
US. support to Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, which were three source nations 
who had demonstrated the political will to combat narcotics trafficking.2 
By early 1994, both Colombia and Peru had announced that they intended 
to shoot down suspected drug trafficking aircraft whose pilots ignored 
directions to land. On 1 May 1994, the United States stopped providing 
intelligence to Colombia and Peru concerning suspected drug trafficking 
flights. There were reports that the Departments of Defense and State 
vehemently disagreed on the wisdom of this action, but there appears to be no 
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dispute that the reason for this change in policy was centered on issues of 
domestic and internationallaw.3 
The Domestic Criminal Law Issue 
The u.s. domestic law problem had its origin in the Montreal Convention, 
which was concluded 23 September 1971 as a measure to combat terrorism 
against civilian airliners. Each contracting State is obligated to either prosecute 
or extradite persons found in its territory who are accused of placing bombs on 
civil aircraft or of damaging or destroying such aircraft. Under the Montreal 
Convention, a State has jurisdiction to prosecute an offender (1) when the 
offense was committed in its territory, (2) when the offense was committed 
against or on board an aircraft registered in that State, (3) when the aircraft on 
board which the offense was committed lands in its territory with the alleged 
offender still on board, or (4) when the aircraft was leased to a lessee which has 
its permanent place of business in that State. The Convention requires each 
Contracting State to make certain offenses punishable under its domestic 
criminal law "by severe penalties."4 
In satisfaction of this obligation, and acting partly in reaction to the August 
1983 Soviet shoot~down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (KAL 007), Congress 
enacted the Aircraft Sabotage Act of 1984, which, inter alia, makes it a crime to 
damage or destroy a civil aircraft registered in a country other than the United 
States.s Since 1956 it has been a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 32 to commit similar 
acts against aircraft registered or operated in the United States. The material 
provisions of the Aircraft Sabotage Act were codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3 2 (b) (2). 
After Peru and Colombia announced their shoot~down policies, officials in 
several agencies became concerned that 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)(2) might make 
military members and other government officials and employees subject to U.S. 
criminal prosecution if they supplied intelligence information or other 
assistance to a foreign government knowing that the government concerned 
intended to use it to shoot down civil aircraft. Ultimately, the Deputy Attorney 
General wrote to the Deputy National Security Adviser that it was 
"imperative" to cut off the supply of the radar information.6 The analysis 
underlying this position is stated in a 14 July 1994 memorandum from the 
Department ofJustice's Office of Legal Counsel, the conclusions of which can 
be briefly summarized as follows: 
(1) 18 U.S.c. § 32 (b) (2) was intended by Congress to 'apply 
extraterritorially. This is clear from its language, from the prior existence of a 
separate statute that prohibited similar acts within the territory of the United 
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States, and from the statute's purpose, which was to satisfy U.S. obligations 
under the Montreal Convention. 
(2) The statute applies to government actors, including law enforcement 
officers and military personnel of foreign countries such as Colombia and Peru. 
(3) U.S. Government personnel who supply intelligence to another 
government with reason to believe it will be used to commit violations of 18 
U.S.C. § 32(b) (2) may be subject to prosecution as an aider or abettor under 18 
U.S.c. § 2(a) or as a conspirator under 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
(4) If a death results, the death penalty or life imprisonment may be 
authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 34. 
(5) No exemption was provided in the statute for military members or other 
U.S. Government officers or employees, or for law enforcement, intelligence, 
or national security activities.7 
This concern for the possible criminal liability of U.S. officials, including 
military members, seems to have been the primary motivation for the cutoff of 
radar generated information on 1 May 1994. The Governments of Peru and 
Colombia objected strongly,8 and the reaction of members of Congress was no 
less heated. The chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the 
Western Hemisphere and of the Subcommittee on International 
Security-both members of the President's party-denounced the 
Administration's position as "absurd."9 The Administration's effort to obtain 
passage of remedial legislation was greatly hampered by the strongly held 
opinion among many Congressmen that 18 U.S.c. § 32 (b) (2) was never 
intended to apply to coalition counterdrug operations, and that Congress had 
more important things to do than to pass a remedial statute to satisfy the 
Administration's overcautious approach to the problem. In any event, 
however, Congress enacted Section 1012 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995,10 which provided for a drug 
interdiction exemption once the President makes certain determinations. This 
provision is codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2291-4, which reads in part: 
Official Immunity for authorized employees and agents of the United States 
and foreign countries engaged in interdiction of aircraft used in illicit drug 
trafficking 
(a) Employees and agents of foreign countries 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall not be unlawful for 
authorized employees or agents of a foreign country {including members of the 
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armed forces of that country) to interdict or attempt to interdict an aircraft in 
that country's territo~ or airspace if-
(1) that aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in 
illicit drug trafficking; and 
(2) the President of the United States, before the interdiction occurs, 
has determined with respect to that country that -
(A) interdiction is necessary because of the extraordinary threat 
posed by illicit drug trafficking to the national security of that 
country; and 
(B) the country has appropriate procedures in place to protect 
against innocent loss of life in the air and on the ground in 
connection with interdiction, which shall at a minimum include 
effective means to identify and warn an aircraft before the use of 
force directed against the aircraft. 
(b) Employees and agents of the United States 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall not be unlawful for 
authorized employees or agents of the United States (including members of the 
Armed Forces of the United States) to provide assistance for the interdiction 
actions of foreign countries authorized under subsection (a) of this section. The 
provision of such assistance shall not give rise to any civil action seeking money 
damages or any other form of relief against the United States or its employees or 
agents (including members of the Armed Forces of the United States). 
On 1 December 1994, the President signed Determination of President No. 
95,7, "Resumption of U.S. Drug Interdiction Assistance to the Government of 
Colombia/'ll in which he made the necessary determinations under the 
statute. On 8 December 1994, a similar determination was signed for Peru.12 
The United States promptly resumed providing radar information to Colombia 
and Peru, and it is reported that in 1995 Peru and Colombia seized or destroyed 
thirty,nine aircraft carrying drugs, driving drug traffickers to rely almost 
exclusively on land and water means of transport in those countries.13 
This seems to be a happy ending, but fans of this legislative fix should take 
careful note of its two major limitations, both of which were clearly quite 
intentional. First, it does not apply to nations for which the necessary 
Presidential determinations have not been made. For example, in May 1995 
the Mexican government announced that its military aircraft would be used to 
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"intercept" aircraft suspected of transporting cocaine through Mexican 
airspace.14 Both Mexican policy in this area and u.s. military support for 
Mexican counterdrug operations are in their formative phases, and only time 
will tell whether Presidential determinations will be sought for Mexico or other 
nations. The second major limitation is that the statutory exception applies 
only when the aircraft intercepted "is reasonably suspected to be primarily 
engaged in illicit drug trafficking." If a host nation uses U.S. intelligence or 
other assistance to shoot down civil aircraft for any other purpose, such as 
enforcement of other criminal laws, no exception to the application of 18 
U.S.C. § 32 (b) (2) would appear to be available. 
This entire episode demonstrates once again the Iron Law of Unintended 
Consequences, as a statute enacted for an indisputably worthy purpose turns 
out to have unfortunate and wholly unintended consequences when its plain 
language is applied in unforeseen circumstances.15 
International Law Issues 
The principal international law issue is the question of when-if 
ever-force can be used against civil aircraft. The Chicago Convention of 
1944, which established the legal framework for international civil aviation, 
contains only one reference to the relationship between State aircraft and civil 
aircraft-Article 3 (d) provides that the contracting States must operate their 
state aircraft with "due regard" for the safety of civil aircraft.16 There is strong 
support for the view that this provision is merely declarative of customary 
international law, but as with most invocations of customary international law, 
there have been sharp differences of opinion as to its practical application. 
The positions taken by various nations in response to a number of 
post,World War II incidents in which scheduled airliners were fired upon 
indicate a majority view that there is an international legal obligation not to 
use force against civilian airliners in international service, but that this 
obligation is subject to the inherent right of self,defense recognized in Article 
51 of the UN Charter. The right of self,defense, however, is strictly limited by 
the principles of necessity and proportionality, and every reasonable 
precaution must be exhausted in order to avoid the loss of life. These 
precautions include communicating with the aircrew to divert it away from 
sensitive areas, escorting it out of national airspace, requiring it to land, 
or-as a last resort-firing warning shots. When Bulgaria shot down an El Al 
airliner in 1955, Israel shot down a Libyan airliner over the Sinai in 1973, the 
Soviet Union crippled a Korean airliner in 1978, and the Soviet Union 
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destroyed KAL 007 in 1983, their actions were all roundly condemned. In each 
case, there appeared to be an international consensus that the actions taken 
were not justified as self,defense.17 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was created by the 
Chicago Convention to serve as a policy forum for its member nations and as a 
mechanism to promote technical cooperation for the conduct of international 
civil aviation. After military aircraft of the Soviet Union shot down KAL 007 
on 13 August 1983, killing its 269 passengers and crew, the resulting 
international outrage led to the unanimous adoption by the 152,member 
International Civil Aviation Organization of a new Article 3 bis to the Chicago 
Convention, intended to more specifically address the existence of an 
international legal obligation to refrain from using force against civil aircraft: 
(a) The contracting States recognize that every State must refrain from resorting 
to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of 
interception, the lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be 
endangered. This provision shall not be interpreted as modifying in any way the 
rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. 
(b) The contracting States recognize that every State, in the exercise of its 
sovereignty, is entitled to require the landing at some designated airport of a civil 
aircraft flying above its territory without authority or if there are reasonable grounds 
to conclude that it is being used for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of this 
Convention; it may also give such aircraft any other instructions to put an end to 
such violations. For this purpose, the contracting States may resort to any means 
consistent with relevant rules of intemationallaw, including the relevant provisions 
of this Convention, specifically paragraph (a) of this Article. Each contracting State 
agrees to publish its regulations in force regarding the interception of civil aircraft. 
(c) Every civil aircraft shall comply with an order given in conformity with 
paragraph (b) of this Article. To this end each contracting State shall establish 
all necessary provisions in its national laws or regulations to make such 
compliance mandatory for any civil aircraft registered in that State or operated 
by an operator who has his principal place of business or permanent residence in 
that State. Each contracting State shall make any violation of such applicable 
laws or regulations punishable by severe penalties and shall submit the case to its 
competent authorities in accordance with its laws or regulations. 
(d) Each contracting State shall take appropriate measures to prohibit the deliberate 
use of any civil aircraft registered in that State or operated by an operator who has his 
principal place of business or permanent residence in that State for any purpose 
85 
Shooting Down Drug Traffickers 
inconsistent with the aims of this Convention. This provision shall not affect 
paragraph (a) or derogate from paragraphs (b) and (c) of this Article. IS 
The United States has not yet ratified Article 3 bis, and the number of 
ratifications is stUl well short of the 102 needed to bring it into effect. 
Nevertheless, there is strong support for the view that it is merely declarative of 
existing customary international law. 19 
There are two distinctly different views concerning whether or not the 
obligation stated in Article 3 bis to refrain from using weapons against civil 
aircraft in flight remains subject to a right of self,defense. One view-that the 
obligation not to use force is subject to no exception for self,defense-is 
expressed in various ICAO publications. ICAO regularly issues a number of 
publications that, while not legally binding in themselves, are some evidence of 
the member States' understanding of applicable international law. For 
example, there is an ICAO publication entitled International Standards-Rules 
of the Air (Annex 2 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation). This 
publication contains provisions adopted by the ICAO Council from time to 
time, acting in a "quasi, legislative function," which creates an expectation that 
contracting States will comply within their territories with the standards 
approved by the Council unless they file a "difference" concerning particular 
rules.20 
Appendix 1 to the Rules of the Air provides standard visual signals for use 
when civil aircraft are intercepted by State aircraft. Appendix 2 contains the 
following provision, which was added as-Amendment 27 to the Rules of the Air 
by vote of the ICAO Council on 10 March 1986: 
1. Principles to be observed by States 
1.1 To achieve the uniformity in regulations which is necessary for the safety 
of navigation of civil aircraft due regard shall be had by Contracting States to the 
following principles when developing regulations and administrative directives: 
a) interception of civil aircraft will be undertaken only as a last resort; 
b) if undertaken, an interception will be limited to determining the 
identity of the aircraft, unless it is necessary to return the aircraft to its 
planned track, direct it beyond the boundaries of national airspace, guide it 
away from a prohibited, restricted or danger area or instruct it to effect a 
landing at a designated airdrome; 
c) practice interception of civil aircraft will not be undertaken; 
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d) navigational guidance and related information will be given to an 
intercepted aircraft by radiotelephony, whenever radio contact can be 
established, and 
e) in the case where an intercepted civil aircraft is required to land in 
the territory overflown, the aerodrome designated for the landing is to be 
suitable for the safe landing of the aircraft type concemed.21 
This provision has been controversial. The United States and a number of 
other members have stated that they consider this action by the ICAO Council 
to be ultra vires, in that Article 3 (a) of the Chicago Convention states clearly 
that the Convention applies only to civil aircraft, and not to state aircraft. 
When the Council adopted the language, the U.S. informed the ICAO 
Secretary General that it disapproved of Amendment 27 on this basis. The 
majority view in the ICAO Council, however, was that the provision in Article 
3 (d), requiring member States to operate their state aircraft with "due regard" 
for the safety of civil aircraft, provided authority for the adoption of 
Amendment 27.22 
Other ICAO publications are prepared by the Secretariat and are only 
advisory in nature. Among these are a Manual Con~erning Safety Measures 
Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft 
Operations,23 and a Manual Concerning Interception of Civil Aircraft.24 The 
latter publication describes in considerable detail the circumstances in which 
interception may occur (including a suspicion that an aircraft is transporting 
illicit goods) as well as detailed discussions of radio signals, flight plans, 
publication of information about restricted areas, position reporting systems, 
radar identification, enhancement of visual markings, procedures to be 
followed when radio communications fail, procedures for interception, and 
related topics. A reminder is included that intercepted aircraft may not 
comply with the instructions given by ground controllers or by intercepting 
aircraft because of confusion, inability to interpret visual signals correctly, 
linguistic misunderstanding of radio messages, hypoxia, or because of inability to 
comply due to malfunction, hijacking, or inadequate fuel. Finally, advice is given as 
to the action to be taken by the intercepting pilot in the event of noncompliance: 
4.1.2.16 In the event that an intercepted aircraft fails to respond to repeated 
attempts to convey instructions by visual signals or radiotelephony, the 
intercepting aircraft should continue to observe the intercepted aircraft until it 
lands or leaves the restricted or prohibited airspace. A full report on the incident 
should then be submitted to the appropriate authority to the State of registry for 
action (see 2.10, Article 3 bis).25 
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Any mention of the possibility of firing a weapon at a nonresponsive aircraft 
is conspicuously absent from this publication. This is fully consistent with the 
published views of the former Director of the ICAO Legal Bureau, Dr. Michael 
Milde, who has written that an intercepting aircraft may use reasonable force 
to enforce compliance by an intercepted aircraft, but not if it involves the use of 
weapons against it.26 One presumes this means that a display of force, including 
the firing of warning shots, forms the outer permissible limit of "reasonable 
force," and that weapons fire directed at a noncomplying aircraft will always be 
c;leemed to exceed "reasonable force." 
A resolution adopted by the ICAO Council in response to the destruction 
by Cuba of two u.S.,registered civil aircraft on 24 February 1996 prOVides 
further support for the view that there is an absolute prohibition against firing 
weapons at civil aircraft. The relevant paragraphs are as follows: 
THE COUNCIL 
2. REAFFIRMS the principle that States must refrain from the use of weapons 
against civil aircraft in flight and that, when intercepting civil aircraft, the lives of 
persons on board and the safety of the aircraft must not be endangered; 
4. REAFFIRMS its condemnation of the use of weapons against civil aircraft in 
flight as being incompatible with elementary considerations of humanity, the 
rules of customary international law as codified in Article 3 bis of the Convention 
on International Civil Aviation, and the Standards and Recommended Practices 
set out in the Annexes to the Convention;27 
When they adopted this resolution, the members of the ICAO Council may 
have intended to reaffirm the view that the prohibition against using weapons 
against civil aircraft is not subject to any exception such as self,defense. On the 
other hand, they may have decided the issue of self,defense was not fairly raised 
by the facts of the incident, and therefore it need not be discussed. Cuba 
maintained that it had acted "in defense of its sovereignty,,,28 but it was clear 
that the previous acts of the Brothers to the Rescue in Cuban territory, the 
most egregious of which apparently consisted of dropping subversive leaflets, 
were not much of a threat to Cuban national security. Furthermore, there was 
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no evidence that the planes that were attacked by Cuba had, during that 
particular flight, engaged in such conduct, and they appear to have been 
outside of Cuban territorial airspace at the time of the attack. 
The view that the obligation to refrain from using force against civil aircraft 
is subject to at least one exception-the inherent right of self,defense-is 
supported by the broad language of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter29 
and by the second sentence of paragraph (a) of Article 3 bis: "This provision 
shall not be interpreted as modifying in any way the rights and obligations of 
States set forth in the Charter of the United Nations." The sentence appears to 
have been added to the text expressly to make it clear that Article 51 applies. It 
is also interesting to read the various commentaries on the Soviet shootdown of 
KAL 007; none of them take the absolute position that there could never be a 
right to fire weapons in self,defense against a civil aircraft. Rather, they go to 
some lengths to demonstrate that there was no factual basis for any argument 
that the shoot,down was necessary, and that obvious alternatives that would 
have avoided innocent loss of life were not exhausted.3D 
The U.S. statute authorizing assistance to countries who have adopted a 
shoot,down policy can be read as relying on the rationale of self,defense. This 
view is supported by the requirement that the President find, inter alia, that 
there is an "extraordinary threat posed by illicit drug trafficking to the national 
security of that country." The international law doctrine of self,defense, 
however, does not provide a particularly good fit for the drug shoot,down 
problem, for the following reasons: 
• First, there has been a long, standing controversy about whether the right 
to use force in self,defense can exist in the absence of an armed attack. This 
argument usually arises in connection with anticipatory or preemptive 
self,defense, but it clearly has considerable force when the issue is whether 
force can be used against aircraft that in most cases have not displayed or used 
armed force, and are not expected to do so. 
• Second, while the drug problem as a whole may pose an extraordinary threat 
to the national security of a country, it will probably be hard to argue that any 
individual aircraft flight presents the sort of urgent danger that has traditionally 
been considered necessary to trigger the right to use force in self,defense.31 
• Third, the offenders typically are not members of the armed forces of 
another nation, or even armed agents as envisaged in the term 
"state,sponsored terrorism.'132 While drug traffickers have cozy relationships 
with the governments of a number of nations, they are not generally operating 
as proxies for those governments in the execution of national policy. They are 
criminals, not actors, on the international political scene. 
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In fact, the law of international civil aviation, including Article 3 his, will not 
apply at all to many shoot,down incidents when the traffickers are nationals of 
the nation shooting them down, when their aircraft are not registered in another 
nation, and when their flights do not cross national borders. International law 
regulates the conduct of nations in their dealings with one another and with each 
other's nationals, property, and corporations. With the limited exception of 
human rights law, international law does not attempt to regulate a nation's 
dealings with its own citizens. The negotiating history of Article 3 his makes it 
quite clear that it is intended to apply only to "foreign aircraft" and not to aircraft 
of a state's own registration engaged in purely domestic traffic.33 For such flights, 
the primary law to be applied is the nation's domestic law, including its law 
governing the permissible use of force against a fleeing suspected felon.34 Where 
an aircraft does not display any registration number or flag and does not 
otherwise communicate any claim to be registered in another nation or to be 
engaged in an international flight, it would be hard to quarrel with a presumption 
by the local authorities that it is a domestic flight. 
It is also clear that foreign civil aircraft are generally subject to the criminal 
law of any nation in whose territory they operate. The primary international 
law question is-how domestic criminal law can be practically enforced against 
foreign aircraft.35 The ultimate issue becomes whether Article 3 his and 
customary international law prevent law enforcement authorities of a nation 
from using weapons against foreign aircraft in its territory even though such use 
of force is authorized under its domestic law. 
A nation's interests in a law enforcement situation differ markedly from those 
involved in a border intrusion. When a nation is primarily concerned with ending 
an isolated unauthorized intrusion into its territorial airspace, that interest is 
served if the intruder departs. In a drug trafficking situation, the nation's interest in 
suppressing persistent drug trafficking is not served by simply escorting individual 
aircraft out of its territory, especially if that was the aircraft's intended destination. 
Reliance on enforcement actions by the aircraft's state of registry will in most cases 
be fruitless. The result may be that the nation concerned may have no practical 
enforcement option except to shoot down the suspected drug trafficker. It appears 
to this author that an attempt to apply Article 3 his and customary international 
law in a manner that deprives nations of any practical remedy adequately serving 
their vital interests is doomed to failure. 
The international community should also recognize that the use of force 
against civil aircraft involved in drug trafficking does not necessarily threaten 
the safety of legitimate civil aviation. Drug traffickers generally operate 
unregistered aircraft, or obscure any identifying markings. They typically file no 
90 
Phillip A. Johnson 
flight plans, refuse to communicate with ground controllers or intercepting 
aircraft, and disregard instructions to land at designated airfields. So long as the 
pilot of an innocent aircraft complies with ICAO standards in these areas, it will 
be perfectly safe from attack by a nation that follows procedures of the sort 
whose existence the President must certify under the U.S. statute. The greatest 
contribution of the statute may tum out to be that it requires both the U.S. and 
the nations it assists to focus on these precautions. 
Accordingly, the most promising approach to understanding the 
international law issues raised by the use of weapons against drug trafficking 
aircraft appears to be a law enforcement perspective, rather than a self,defense 
analysis. If a nation's domestic law permits using force against a suspected drug 
trafficking aircraft that refuses to comply with instructions from an 
intercepting aircraft, and if it observes rigorous precautions against mistakenly 
attacking innocent aircraft, the use of force in these circumstances should be 
regarded as legitimate. 
In support of this conclusion, one could argue further that the language of 
Article 3 bis to the effect that the phrase "This provision shall not be interpreted as 
modifying in any way the rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of 
the United Nations," not only preserves the right of nations to use force in 
self-defense, but that it also preserves their immunity from outside interference in 
"matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State" as 
guaranteed in Article 2 (7) of the Charter. The administration of criminal law 
within a nation's borders has traditionally been considered such a matter. 
Additionally, there is very little likelihood that a nation adopting a policy of 
shooting down drug trafficking aircraft will be subject to serious criticism or 
sanctions from the international community. Drug traffickers have no vocal 
champions among the family of nations, and the interests of legitimate civil 
aviation will not be threatened as long as appropriate precautions are in place. 
In fact, there appears to be no record to date that any nation has protested the 
shoot,down policies adopted by Peru and Colombia, or the assistance provided 
to them by the United States. The only event likely to precipitate such a protest 
would be a ghastly mistake in which a planeload of innocents is blown out of 
the sky. 
~~ Thatever one may think of the urgency of solving the domestic law W W issues raised by the U.S. policy of assisting other nations which 
shoot down drug trafficking aircraft, they appear to have been solved by the 
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1994 statute codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2291,4. The intemationa11aw issues raised 
by a drug shoot,down policy are still unsettled, but such a policy should be 
accepted as a legitimate law, enforcement measure so long as rigorous 
precautions are in place to prevent the loss of innocent life. 
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